



TikTok's DSA Transparency Report

July - December 2024





Introduction

At TikTok, our mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. The safety and well-being of our community is our priority, TikTok has a strong track record in proactive transparency reporting; we have been publishing [transparency reports](#) since 2019. We also report on our efforts to combat disinformation on our platform under the [Code of Practice on Disinformation](#) on a six monthly basis. Building on our transparency efforts and in line with our obligations under the Digital Services Act (DSA), we are pleased to publish our fourth DSA transparency report for the reporting period of 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024.

On 9 December 2024, TikTok launched TikTok Shop in Ireland and Spain. The report therefore includes data for TikTok Shop for the relevant portion of the reporting period.

We have a number of measures designed to keep users safe across priority areas, including from illegal and other harmful content. We are pleased to report on the numbers underlying these measures including the additional reporting option we have implemented to allow people to report content in the European Union they believe is illegal. Key insights from this report include:

- During the report's time period, we proactively removed approximately 18 million pieces of violative content under our Policies (defined below).
- We also received around 231,000 illegal content reports corresponding to approximately 123,000 unique pieces of content. Of these, about 12% were removed for violating our Policies, and a further 16% were restricted for being in violation of the law.
- We are introducing new metrics to provide even greater transparency. For the first time, we are reporting on illegal content reports from Trusted Flaggers and publishing data on out-of-court disputes.

Providing transparency to our community about how we keep them safe is an ongoing commitment that has no finish line. We are pleased to have built upon the efforts of our previous DSA transparency reports, for example, by providing greater granularity on metrics relating to accuracy and error rates, as well as those relating to our appeals, in this fourth DSA transparency report. We acknowledge that we still have more work to do and we have set out the limitations to our reporting in each of the annexes. We are continuing to work hard to address these points in future DSA transparency reports.

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Section 1. Content moderation

TikTok strives to foster an open and inclusive environment where people can create, find community, and be entertained. To maintain that environment, we take action upon content and accounts that violate our applicable terms and policies, including our [Terms of Service](#), [Community Guidelines](#), [Advertising Policies](#) and TikTok Shop Policies (together, our **Policies**). We are committed to being transparent with our community about the moderation actions we take. The number and type of restrictions we impose as part of our content moderation activities are available at **Annex A**.

Our Policies are the starting point when it comes to how we form and operate our content moderation strategies and practices and they contain provisions which prohibit various forms of illegal and other harmful content. We use a combination of automation and human moderation to identify, review, and action content that violates our Policies.

Key principles

We operate our content moderation processes using automation and human moderation in accordance with the following four pillars, which provide that we will:

1. Remove violative content from the platform that violates our Policies, or restrict content which is illegal (noting that we do not allow several types of mature content themes, including gory, gruesome, disturbing, or extremely violent content);
2. Age-restrict mature content (that does not violate our Community Guidelines but which contains mature themes) so it is only viewed by adults (18 years and older);
3. Maintain For You feed eligibility standards to help ensure any content that may be promoted by the recommendation system is appropriate for a broad audience; and
4. Empower our community with information, tools, and resources.

Automated Review

We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content and reduce exposure to potentially distressing content of our human moderators. Content that is uploaded to the platform is first reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which aims to identify content that violates our Policies before it is viewed or shared by other people on the platform or reported to us. While undergoing this review, the content is visible only to the uploader.

If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either be automatically removed from the platform or flagged for further review by our human moderation teams. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut.

We use a variety of automated tools, including:

- Computer Vision models, which help to detect objects (for example visual signals, emblems, logos and objects that are known to be associated with extremist and hate groups) so it can be determined whether the content likely contains material which violates our Policies.
- Keyword lists and models are used to review text and audio content to detect material in violation of our Policies. We work with various external experts, like our [fact-checking partners](#), to inform our keyword lists.
- Where we have previously detected content that violates our Policies, we use de-duplication and hashing technologies that enable us to recognise copies or near copies of such content. This is used to prevent further re-distribution of violative content on the platform.
- We work with external groups, for example [Tech Against Terrorism](#) in the context of [violent extremist](#) content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.

We are continuing to invest in improving the precision of our automated moderation systems so that we can more effectively remove violative content at scale, while also reducing the number of incorrect removals. If users or advertisers believe we have made a mistake, they can [appeal](#) the removal of their content.

In assessing the effectiveness of our automated moderation technologies, the H2 2024 DSA transparency report captures a broader range of automated enforcement actions when compared with our previous report. We consider that the appropriate indicator of accuracy is the proportion of content where the original enforcement decision was upheld or maintained. We consider that the appropriate indicator of error is the proportion of content where the original enforcement decision was overturned. For H2 2024, the accuracy rate for our automated moderation technologies for content was 99.1% and the error rate was 0.9% (see **Annex B** for more information).

Human moderation

In order to support fair and consistent review of potentially violative content, moderators work alongside our automated moderation systems and take into account additional context and nuance which may not always be picked up by technology.

Human moderation also helps improve our automated moderation systems by providing feedback for the underlying machine learning models to strengthen our ongoing detection capabilities. This continuous improvement helps to reduce the volume of potentially distressing videos that moderators view and enables them to focus more on content that requires a greater understanding of context and nuance (such as misinformation, hate speech and harassment). The responsibilities of our content moderators includes:

- **Reviewing content flagged by technology:** When our automated moderation systems identify potentially problematic content but cannot make an automated decision to remove it, they send the content to our moderation teams for further review. To support this work, we have developed technology that can identify potentially violative items – for example, emblems associated with extremist groups – in video frames, so that content moderators can carefully review the video and the context in which it appears. This technology improves the efficiency of moderators by helping them more adeptly identify violative images or objects, quickly recognise violations, and make decisions accordingly.
- **Reviewing reports from its community:** Community reporting helps us maintain a safe environment. We offer our community easy-to-use in-app and online reporting tools so they can flag any content or account they feel is in violation of our Policies or may be illegal. TikTok's trusted partners also play a role in helping detect and remove harmful content. Through our Community Partner Channel Program, participating civil society organizations with a broad range of expertise across online and content safety can report potentially violative or illegal content to us directly for review. Community reports are an important component of our content moderation process, however, the vast majority of removed content is identified proactively before it is reported to us (see **Annex A** for more information).
- **Reviewing popular content:** We manually review video content when it reaches certain levels of popularity in terms of the number of video views, reducing the risk of violative content being shown in the For You Feed or otherwise being widely disseminated.
- **Assessing appeals:** If someone disagrees with our decision to restrict or remove their content or an account, they can [appeal](#) the decision for reconsideration. These appeals may be sent to moderators to decide if the content should be reinstated on the platform or the account reinstated.

Section 2. Illegal content reports

Our Policies apply to all accounts and content on the platform, and they often align with, and sometimes go beyond, local law requirements. While we primarily enforce our Policies at our own initiative through automated and human moderation, users can also use the reporting functions to alert TikTok to content they believe violates our Policies. The number of reports made in the European Union to TikTok during the period 1 July 2024 to 31 December 2024 is at **Annex C**. Under DSA, trusted flaggers can also submit illegal content reports.

As part of our requirements under the DSA, we have introduced an [additional reporting channel](#) for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content', which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the

law. When users report suspected illegal content, they will be asked to select a category of illegal content they are reporting under. Reporters are also asked to provide additional information, such as: the jurisdiction in question; if possible, the specific law in question; and a clear explanation as to why they think the content violates the law. If the report is incomplete (for example, it does not provide enough information for us to assess if the content is illegal) or materially unsubstantiated, the report may be rejected. The reporter will be notified of this decision and provided with an opportunity to re-submit their report with more information. This helps us properly and effectively consider and respond to each report.

Illegal content reports are processed through a combination of automation and human review. We will review the content against our Policies and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally. If it is not removed, our illegal content moderation team will further review the content to assess whether it is unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction - this assessment is undertaken by human review. In making our determination, we are required to balance any competing legal rights, such as freedom of speech. Content found to be illegal will generally be restricted in the country where it is illegal or, in some cases, across the EEA region or by removing the content from the platform entirely. Those who report suspected illegal content will be notified of our decision, including if we consider that the content is not illegal. Users who disagree can [appeal](#) those decisions using the appeals process.

Section 3. TikTok's moderators

Our mission to inspire creativity and bring joy to people around the world is made possible by the critical work of our content moderators who review and remove illegal and other harmful content and behaviour from the platform. TikTok has 5,807 people dedicated to the moderation of content in the European Union as of the end of December 2024 (see **Annex D** for more information).

Our Trust & Safety teams lead our approach to content moderation. They are responsible for the development of our Community Guidelines and related moderation policies, and for the moderation of content on TikTok. For the European Union, TikTok's Trust & Safety work is led from Dublin, Ireland, where a number of key global Trust & Safety personnel are based. For ads and branded content, our Monetisation Integrity and Business Integrity teams are responsible for TikTok's Advertising Policies and related moderation policies, and play a key role in their moderation. Our TikTok Shop Governance & Experience teams develop TikTok Shop policies, and are involved in the moderation of TikTok Shop listings and other TikTok Shop-related content.

Training

To ensure a consistent understanding and application of our Policies, all content moderator personnel receive training across our relevant Policies. All content moderators undergo training on TikTok's content moderation systems and moderator wellness issues. Personnel involved in reviewing reported illegal content receive additional focused training on assessing the legality of reported illegal content.

Content moderation training materials are kept under review to ensure that they are accurate and current. Such materials include clearly defined learning objectives to ensure our content moderators understand the core policy issues and their underlying policy rationale, key terms and policy exceptions (where applicable).

Members of our moderation teams attend regular internal sessions dedicated to knowledge sharing and discussion about relevant issues and trends, which include input from external experts. For example, as part of our Election Speaker Series, which helps inform our approach to elections, we invite suitably qualified external local and regional experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. During this report period, we hosted 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, and Romania) and 2 in Georgia and Moldova. .

Our teams also participate in various external events to share expertise and support their continued professional learning. These engagements contribute to the team's awareness of the risks which may arise on the platform, which in turn informs our approach to content moderation. At the end of June 2024, we sent a 12 strong delegation to [GlobalFact11](#) in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. TikTok was one of three top-tier sponsors of GlobalFact11, the

[International Fact-Checking Network](#)'s largest gathering for professional fact-checkers. In addition to sponsorship, we participated in an on-the-record mainstage presentation answering questions about our misinformation strategy and partnerships with professional fact-checkers. In September 2024, we sent a delegation of 16 to the [Trust & Safety Research Conference](#) at Stanford University. And, in October, we sponsored, attended, and presented at [Disinfo24](#) the annual EU DisinfoLab Conference in Riga.

Support

At TikTok, building and maintaining a safe experience for our community is of the utmost importance. Our primary focus is on preventative care measures to minimise the risk of psychological injury through well-timed support, training and tools, from recruitment through to onboarding and throughout their time moderating TikTok content, that help foster resilience, while minimising the risk of psychological injury. These may include tools and features to allow moderators to control exposure to graphic content when reviewing or moderating content, including grayscaling, muting and blurring; training for managers to help them identify when a team member may need additional well-being support; and clinical and therapeutic support.

While we focus on preventative care measures, our moderators may be required at times to review potentially harmful content, which makes providing the right support essential. We recognise this, and are focused on and committed to prioritising the health, safety, and well-being of our people. We use an evidence-based approach to develop programs and resources that support moderators' psychological well-being.

For our Trust & Safety teams, we also provide them with membership to the Trust and Safety Professional Association. This membership allows them to access resources for career development, participate in workshops and events, and connect with a network of peers across the industry.

Qualifications & linguistic expertise

Some of the issues which arise on the platform are highly localised in terms of language and region, which requires deep knowledge and awareness of relevant cultural nuances, terms and context.

To address this, and ensure its content moderators are appropriately qualified to make decisions, we have regional policy teams in each region, which includes coverage for all European Union Member States, for example with either designated policy country managers for larger countries or policy managers covering a number of smaller countries.

Based primarily in Dublin, the role of our EMEA regional policy team is to bring regional insights, cultural context, local knowledge and policy understanding to ensure that global moderation policies are localised as appropriate for the particular context (i.e. across various countries and regions within the European Union). The team plays an important role in risk detection and identification and mitigation at a regional and local level through its subject matter expertise; close collaboration with cross-functional teams to detect regional/local trends (such as localised trends); engagement with external experts, such as NGOs and civil society organisations, and government authorities.

The localised policy outputs from the EMEA regional policy team enable our content moderation teams to take a regionally informed approach to content moderation (e.g. rapidly evolving alternative vocabulary or terminology in relation to an unfolding election issue, which may vary/evolve over time and as between countries and languages).

We have also established a number of specialised moderation teams to assist our moderators review content relating to complex issues. For example, assessing harmful misinformation requires additional context and assessment by our misinformation moderators who have enhanced training, expertise and tools to identify such content, including our global repository of previously fact-checked claims from the IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and direct access to our fact-checking partners where appropriate.

We moderate content in more than 70 languages globally and we are transparent in our [regular Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports](#) about the primary languages our moderators work in globally. We have language capabilities covering at least one official language for each of the 27 European Union Member States, as well as a

number of other languages that are commonly spoken in the region (for example, Arabic and Turkish). This language capability complements our awareness-raising materials, like the Community Guidelines, that are also available in multiple languages. We also have moderation personnel that are not assigned to a particular language, who assist with reviewing content such as photos and profiles.

Section 4. Orders from government authorities

We may receive requests from government authorities in the European Union to remove content. When we receive such requests from government authorities, we review and take action upon content in line with our Policies and the applicable law. During the period 1 July 2024 and 31 December 2024, we received 701 requests from government authorities in the European Union to remove content (see **Annex E** for more information).

We may also receive requests from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure. We respond to these in a manner that respects the privacy and other rights of our users. Any request we receive is carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis in line with our [Law Enforcement Guidelines](#). Our policies and procedures govern how we handle and respond to such requests and only disclose user data where a request is based on a valid legal process. During the period 1 July 2024 and 31 December 2024, we received 9,039 information requests from government authorities in the European Union (see **Annex F** for more information).

Section 5. Complaints and disputes

Complaints

Anyone can report content on TikTok they believe violates our Policies or applicable laws and can appeal if they disagree with the outcome of our decision. Users are also provided with a notification where we determine that they have violated our Policies and applicable laws, and they are provided with an opportunity to appeal against any action we have taken. We provide information to users about how to appeal a decision in relation to a report they have made, or how to appeal a decision affecting their content or account [here](#). We report on the number of appeals, and the action we take in response to those appeals, in **Annex G**.

Disputes submitted to out-of-court dispute settlement bodies

The DSA provides users of the platform with the right to access a third party out-of-court dispute settlement process to resolve any disputes that they may have with us regarding moderation actions (including in relation to any appeals), essentially allowing users to submit appeals of content moderation decisions to an independent third party for assessment. We report on the number of appeals submitted to these bodies, the outcomes of the dispute settlement, the median time needed for completing the dispute settlement procedures, and the share of appeals where we implemented the decisions of the body, in **Annex G**.

Section 6. Suspensions

We may suspend or permanently ban accounts where we identify violations of our Policies, including where:

- the user does not meet the minimum age or other requirements as indicated in our Terms of Service;
- the account impersonates another person or entity in a deceptive manner;
- a user has a severe violation on their account (such as promoting or threatening violence);
- an account reaches the strike threshold for multiple violations within a policy or feature; or
- multiple violations of our Intellectual Property Policy.

We report on the number of accounts suspended during the period 1 July 2024 and 31 December 2024 for violations of our Policies in **Annex A**. TikTok has a system for suspending users that repeatedly violate our Community Guidelines. Within the relevant period, this system issued 633,813 bans based on the severity and frequency of the violations. Separate to the rejection of incomplete or materially unsubstantiated illegal content reports, TikTok did not



suspend the processing of illegal content reports or complaints due to individuals frequently submitting manifestly unfounded notices or manifestly unfounded complaints.

Section 7. Average monthly recipients per Member State

We report on the average number of ‘monthly active recipients’, broken down per each of the 27 European Union Member States in **Annex H** during the period from July to December 2024.



Annex A - TikTok's own-initiative content moderation

This Annex A provides the number of moderation actions we took against content and accounts under our Policies. It consists of numbers of user-generated video and LIVE content removed and restricted, for example according to the application of our [Eligibility Standards](#) or [Content Levels](#), as well as restrictions imposed on access to features (i.e. service restriction), and the number of ads and items of TikTok Shop-related content removed.

Content-level moderation actions

This table sets out the number of the content-level moderation actions taken where content is found to violate our Policies, broken down by the type of policy that the content has been actioned under and by the moderation action taken.

| | | Type of moderation action taken | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | Content Removed | Content Restricted | Service Restricted |
| Type of policy actioned under | Community Guidelines | 21,189,215 | 157,632,063 | 1,120,308 |
| | Advertising Policies | 1,548,360 | N.A | N.A |
| | TikTok Shop Policies | 119,990 | N.A | 915 |



This table sets out the number of the content items removed where content is found to violate our Policies, broken down by the sub-policy under our Community Guidelines, our Advertising Policies, and TikTok Shop Policies and by the number of content items removed using our automated moderation technology. Content may violate multiple policies and each violation is reflected in the breakdown of each of the respective sub-policies.

| Type of policy | Detection method | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Total content removed | Content removed automatically |
| Community Guidelines | 21,189,215 | 11,422,419 |
| Youth Safety & Well-Being | 6,003,450 | 3,632,585 |
| Safety & Civility | 4,543,074 | 2,144,455 |
| Mental & Behavioral Health | 4,789,349 | 3,475,037 |
| Sensitive & Mature Themes | 8,370,219 | 5,121,429 |
| Regulated Goods & Commercial Activities | 7,382,359 | 4,847,717 |
| Privacy & Security | 399,111 | 251,257 |
| Integrity & Authenticity | 911,374 | 734,367 |
| Advertising Policies | 1,548,360 | 1,216,648 |
| Ad Format | 181,833 | 136,777 |
| Adult & Sexual content | 50,506 | 36,656 |
| IP infringement | 45,998 | 31,963 |
| Misleading & False Content | 278,718 | 211,687 |
| Politics & Religion & Culture | 77,634 | 29,759 |
| Prohibited & Restricted Content | 171,946 | 143,240 |
| Prohibited & Restricted Industry | 735,457 | 622,832 |



| Type of policy | Detection method | |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Total content removed | Content removed automatically |
| Violence & Horror & Dangerous activity | 6,268 | 3,734 |
| TikTok Shop Policies | 119,990 | N.A |
| Consumer Protection | 119,989 | N.A |
| Youth Safety | 1 | N.A |
| Other Systemic Risks | 0 | N.A |

Account-level moderation actions

This table sets out the number of account-level restrictions (i.e. account suspensions or bans) taken against users and advertisers who have been found to have violated our Policies, broken down by the number of accounts actioned using our automated moderation technology.

| Detection method | | Type of moderation action taken |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| | | Account ban / suspension |
| | Total removed / suspended | 4,765,235 |
| | Accounts banned / suspended automatically | 833,416 |



Annex B - Automated Review

This Annex B provides a breakdown of the indicators of accuracy and possible rate of error of our automated moderation technologies across the EU Member States. In our fourth DSA transparency report, we have captured a broader range of automated enforcement actions when compared to our previous report, and the table below now includes metrics relating to the removal, as well as the restriction, of user-generated video and ads content. We consider that the appropriate indicator of accuracy is the proportion of videos and ads where the original enforcement decision was upheld or maintained. We consider that the appropriate indicator of error is the proportion of videos and ads content where the original enforcement decision was overturned.

| Accuracy and Error Rate Across Member States | | |
|--|------------|---------------|
| Country Code | Error rate | Accuracy Rate |
| AT | 1.5% | 98.5% |
| BE | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| BG | 0.3% | 99.7% |
| CY | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| CZ | 1.1% | 98.9% |
| DE | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| DK | 0.8% | 99.2% |
| EE | 0.8% | 99.2% |
| ES | 1.1% | 98.9% |
| FI | 1.2% | 98.8% |
| FR | 1.6% | 98.4% |
| GR | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| HR | 0.7% | 99.3% |



| Accuracy and Error Rate Across Member States | | |
|--|------------|---------------|
| Country Code | Error rate | Accuracy Rate |
| HU | 0.6% | 99.4% |
| IE | 1.1% | 98.9% |
| IT | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| LT | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| LU | 1.0% | 99.0% |
| LV | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| MT | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| NL | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| PL | 0.5% | 99.5% |
| PT | 0.4% | 99.6% |
| RO | 0.4% | 99.6% |
| SE | 1.1% | 98.9% |
| SI | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| SK | 0.7% | 99.3% |



Annex C - Illegal content reports

Illegal content reports by users

TikTok has an additional reporting channel for our European Union community to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. This Annex C provides a breakdown of the illegal content reports we received from users within the European Union in relation to user-generated videos, LIVES, ads and TikTok Shop-related content, broken down by the category of illegal content it has been reported under.

Where a median time has been provided for an action that has been taken, this has been calculated to take into account the respective number of actions and each feature's median time, in order to provide an accurate representation of the time taken across different features. This applies to median time calculations provided throughout this report.

We received a total number of 231,711 illegal content reports in the European Union, which corresponds to user reports on 122,913 unique items of content. Of the unique items of content reported, we took action against (i) 19,888 items of content on the basis that it violated local laws and (ii) 14,744 items of content on the basis that it breached our Policies. No action was taken on the remaining content reported, either because it was not found to be violative under our Policies or the relevant local laws or because the initial report did not contain enough information.

Median time needed for taking action pursuant to the illegal content reports: The median time between our receipt of an illegal content report and deciding whether or not to action that content under our Policies is under 7 hours, and under applicable law is less than 16 hours. The median time necessarily takes account of the time taken to review more complex user reports requiring a nuanced consideration of the legal requirements by a legal reviewer against the applicable local law. Assessing these reports can be a complex task as we strive to be consistent and equitable in our enforcement, while also weighing up our decisions against other important interests such as freedom of expression.

| Category of reported illegal content | Number of user reports received |
|--|---------------------------------|
| Information-related offences / contempt of court | 5,529 |
| Content relating to violent or organised crime | 8,457 |
| National security-related offences | 4,876 |
| Terrorist offences / content | 11,486 |
| Illegal goods / services | 19,753 |
| Consumer- related offences | 9,110 |



| Category of reported illegal content | Number of user reports received |
|--|---------------------------------|
| Child sexual exploitation | 14,325 |
| Defamation | 12,724 |
| Non-consensual sharing of private or intimate images | 24,247 |
| Illegal hate speech | 22,429 |
| Illegal privacy- related violations | 30,007 |
| Harassment or threats | 16,191 |
| Financial crime | 15,957 |
| Other illegal content | 36,620 |

Illegal content reports by Trusted Flaggers

As noted above under Section 2 above, trusted flaggers can also submit illegal content reports under the DSA. In this regard, TikTok has introduced an additional reporting channel for our European Union community to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables trusted flaggers to report content they consider to be illegal. This reporting channel was introduced at the end of H1 2024 and therefore it is the first time reporting metrics for trusted flaggers have been included in our DSA transparency report.

To date, we received a total number of 59 illegal content reports from trusted flaggers in the European Union relating to 44 unique items of content. Of the unique items of reported content, we took action against (i) 23 items of content for violating local laws and (ii) 0 items of content for breaching our Policies. Where no action was taken on reported content, it was because we found no violations under our Policies or relevant local laws, or because the report did not contain enough information.

Median time needed for taking action pursuant to the illegal content reports: The median time between our receipt of an illegal content report from a trusted flagger and deciding whether or not to action that content under applicable law is less than 52 hours.



| Category of reported illegal content | Number of user reports received |
|--|---------------------------------|
| Information - related offences / contempt of court | 0 |
| Content relating to violent or organised crime | 0 |
| National security-related offences | 0 |
| Terrorist offences / content | 1 |
| Illegal goods / services | 2 |
| Consumer- related offences | 0 |
| Child sexual exploitation | 14 |
| Defamation | 6 |
| Non-consensual sharing of private or intimate images | 0 |
| Illegal hate speech | 5 |
| Illegal privacy- related violations | 26 |
| Harassment or threats | 5 |
| Financial crime | 0 |
| Other illegal content | 0 |



Annex D - TikTok's content moderators

This Annex D sets out the number of people who are dedicated to content moderation in line with our Policies and applicable local laws, broken down per each of the official European Union languages. Our moderators often have linguistic expertise across multiple languages. Where our moderators have linguistic expertise in more than one European Union language, that expertise is reflected in the detailed language breakdown below. For example, the Czech, Slovakian and Slovenian languages are grouped under one category within our Trust & Safety team and are moderated by the same moderators. The moderators allocated for the Croatian language also cover the Serbian language. These numbers also include moderators covering a number of other languages that are commonly spoken in the region, such as Arabic, Catalan, Hindi, Pashto, Persian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Norwegian, Russian and Icelandic.

The numbers in Annex D do not reflect the broader teams who also play a key role in keeping our community safe (for example, those involved in the development of our content moderation policies).

Based on calculations undertaken during the reporting period, we have 5,807 moderators who are dedicated to moderating content in the European Union. This includes 1,360 non-language specific moderators (meaning the moderators who review profiles or photos) that are not reflected in the numbers below, which consist only of language moderators.

| People dedicated to content moderation | |
|--|--|
| Official Member State language | Number of people dedicated to content moderation |
| Bulgarian | 38 |
| Croatian | 29 |
| Czech | 53 |
| Danish | 15 |
| Dutch | 99 |
| English | 1,524 |
| Estonian | 17 |
| Finnish | 31 |
| French | 509 |



| People dedicated to content moderation | |
|--|--|
| Official Member State language | Number of people dedicated to content moderation |
| German | 532 |
| Greek | 50 |
| Hungarian | 51 |
| Irish | 0 |
| Italian | 290 |
| Latvian | 22 |
| Lithuanian | 19 |
| Maltese | 0 |
| Polish | 146 |
| Portuguese | 160 |
| Romanian | 99 |
| Slovak | 33 |
| Slovenian | 37 |
| Spanish | 531 |
| Swedish | 72 |



Annex E - Orders from government authorities to remove content

TikTok has a dedicated channel through which government authorities may submit orders to request to remove content. This Annex E provides the numbers of requests received through our dedicated channel from government authorities in the European Union to remove content, broken down by category of illegal content reported.

Between 1 July 2024 and 31 December 2024, we received 701 orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content.

Median time needed to inform government authority of receipt of order: We acknowledge receipt of an order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel immediately, by sending an automatic acknowledgement.

Median time needed to give effect to the order: The median time between our receipt of a valid order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel and us investigating and actioning, either by removing the content or otherwise providing a substantive response to the issuing government authority, is under 6 hours.



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content

Categories of illegal content by Member State

| Categories of illegal content | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | ES | FI | FR | GR | HR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK |
|--|----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Child Sexual Exploitation | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Terrorist Offences / Content | 1 | 5 | | | 1 | 144 | 11 | | 2 | 2 | 197 | | | | | | | 2 | | | 2 | | | | | | |
| Illegal Hate Speech | | 1 | | | | 70 | | | 1 | | 30 | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 6 | | | 1 |
| Content Relating to Violent or Organised Crime | | | | | | 3 | | | | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | |
| Illegal Privacy-Related Violations | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-Consensual Sharing of Private or Intimate Images | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 15 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Illegal Goods / Services | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 4 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | |
| Harassment or Threats | | | | | | 5 | | 6 | | 1 | 10 | | | 5 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 2 | 1 | 10 | | | | |
| Defamation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Consumer-related Offences | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Information-Related Offences / Contempt of Court | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 28 | | 8 | | | |
| Financial Crime | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | |
| National Security-Related Offences | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other Illegal or Harmful Content | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Annex F - Orders from government authorities to provide information

TikTok has a dedicated channel through which government authorities may submit orders to request disclosure of information. This Annex F provides the number of requests we received through our dedicated channel from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure, broken down by category of illegal content reported.

Between 1 July 2024 and 31 December 2024, we received 9039 orders from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure.

Median time needed to inform government authority of receipt of order: We acknowledge receipt of order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel immediately, by sending an automatic acknowledgement.

Median time needed to give effect to the order: The median time between our receipt of a valid order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel and us either providing the requested information, or otherwise providing a substantive response to the government authority issuing the order, is around 7 days. This median time includes both time taken to review more complex orders, which can include varying amounts of content, accounts or other identifiers that require processing, and situations where TikTok responds to the requesting government authority to seek clarification or further context in respect of the order, but where the requesting government authority provides no response. Such cases are closed after 28 days.



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information

Category of illegal content by Member State

| Categories of illegal content | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | ES | FI | FR | GR | HR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK |
|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Child Exploitation | 2 | 20 | 2 | | | | 188 | 3 | 13 | 15 | 24 | 9 | 2 | | 3 | 12 | | | | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 28 | 1 | |
| Criminal Defamation | 3 | 8 | | | | | 79 | | 18 | 7 | 35 | 13 | 1 | 1 | | 34 | | | | | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 9 | | |
| Domestic Violence | | | | | | | 5 | 1 | 40 | | 8 | | | | | 2 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | | |
| Drug Trafficking | 1 | 1 | | | | | 43 | | 1 | | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 2 | | 3 | 1 | | |
| Environmental Crimes Animal Welfare | | | 1 | | | | 2 | | | | 5 | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Extortion Blackmail | 12 | 9 | | | | | 77 | | 11 | | 52 | 5 | | | | 11 | | | | | 2 | | | | 6 | | |
| Faked Hacked Account | 4 | 4 | 1 | | | | 80 | | 37 | 1 | 41 | 3 | 1 | | | 18 | | | | | | 5 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 1 | |
| Financial Fraud | 21 | 4 | | | 2 | | 205 | | 53 | | 19 | 7 | 3 | 3 | | 9 | 2 | | | 3 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 10 | 6 | | |
| Firearms Weapons Possession Explosives | 1 | 4 | | | | | 24 | | | | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | 2 | | | | 6 | | |
| Fugitive | | | | | | | 50 | | | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | 14 | | | |
| Harassment Bullying | 7 | 34 | | | | | 163 | 1 | 39 | 3 | 77 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 10 | | | | 6 | 4 | | | 3 | 20 | | |
| Hate Speech | 13 | 1 | | | | 2 | 1698 | | 12 | 2 | 25 | 11 | | | | 5 | 1 | | | | | 5 | | | 1 | | |
| Homicide Murder | | 10 | 1 | | | | 57 | | 4 | | 13 | | | | 6 | 2 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 14 | | |
| Human Exploitation Trafficking | 7 | 1 | | | | | 31 | | 3 | | 6 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | 3 | | | |
| Intellectual Property | | | 1 | | | | 45 | | 6 | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 3 | | | |



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information

Category of illegal content by Member State

| Categories of illegal content | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | ES | FI | FR | GR | HR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK |
|-------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|-----|----|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Kidnapping | | 1 | | | | | 12 | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 2 | | |
| Missing Adult | | 1 | | | | | 2 | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | |
| Missing Minor | 2 | 3 | | | | | 34 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | 4 | 1 | | |
| National Security Terrorism | 26 | 80 | | | | | 907 | | 156 | 3 | 2798 | | | 1 | 2 | 27 | 1 | | | 1 | 60 | | | 1 | | | |
| Organized Crime | | 2 | | | | | 27 | | 2 | 1 | 8 | 1 | | | 3 | 5 | | | | | | 1 | | 2 | 4 | | |
| Physical Assault | | 3 | | | | | 56 | | 2 | 2 | 9 | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | |
| Road Traffic Offenses | | | | | | | 12 | | 1 | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| Robbery Theft | 4 | 3 | | | | | 87 | | 13 | 3 | 20 | 2 | 1 | | 4 | 1 | | | | | 2 | | | 4 | 4 | | |
| Sex Crimes | 6 | 10 | | | | | 177 | 1 | 21 | 3 | 34 | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 10 | | | | | 1 | | 2 | | 8 | | |
| Sextortion | 12 | 13 | | | | | 42 | 2 | 26 | | 22 | | | | | 12 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | |
| Suicide Self Harm | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | |
| Threat To Kill | 9 | 5 | 1 | | | | 111 | 1 | 32 | 5 | 39 | 8 | | | | 13 | | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | 23 | | |



Annex G - Complaints and disputes

TikTok provides notifications to users who have violated our Policies or applicable local laws. Users who report content that they believe violates our Policies or applicable local laws are also notified of the outcome of TikTok's decision. In both cases, users can appeal the decision once they receive the notification. This Annex G comprises the number of appeals received from users who have appealed the outcome of content they have reported, as well as users or advertisers who have appealed a decision to remove their content.

Total number of appeals received: Between 1 July and 31 December 2024, we received 3,085,974 appeals from users and advertisers who uploaded content to the platform and who appealed the moderation action to: remove their video or ad content, or restrict their access to LIVE under our Policies; or geoblock their content under applicable local laws. In the same time period, we also received 717,421 appeals from users who reported content which they believed violated our Policies or applicable local laws.

Basis for those complaints: When appealing a decision, in many cases, users and advertisers are given the opportunity to include a written explanation to set out the basis of their appeal. Where users and advertisers are given the opportunity to explain their basis of appeal by free text, the bases of appeals necessarily vary between each user or advertiser submitting an appeal.

Decisions taken in respect of the complaints: Between 1 July and 31 December 2024, we reinstated or removed restrictions from 1,449,500 pieces of user-generated video or ad content, or access to LIVE. In the same period, we removed 43,289 user-generated videos or ad content, or access to LIVE, following an appeal from a user who reported content which they believed violated our Policies or applicable local laws. Note that these numbers cannot be compared directly to the number of moderation actions taken or the number of actions appealed in that period. This is because some moderation decisions may have been appealed within the previous time period, and the outcome of some moderation decisions may not be actioned until the next time period.

Median time needed for taking the decisions: The median time for TikTok to decide on an appeal submitted by a user or advertiser on moderation action taken on their content, across all relevant features, is under 2 hours. The median time for TikTok to decide on an appeal submitted by a user on the outcome of content they reported is under 2 hours.

Out of court disputes

In H2 2024, we received 173 complaints under Article 21 of the DSA from Dispute Settlement Bodies about our content moderation decisions, of which, during the same time period, 59 cases were closed. Of these, the Dispute Settlement Body has: (i) disagreed with TikTok's content moderation decision in 17 cases (11 of which we implemented the decision); (ii) agreed with TikTok's content moderation decision in 13 cases; and (iii) resolved the complaint without issuing a formal decision in 29 cases.

The median time for handling these Article 21 appeals was around 71 days, which includes the time taken for each of the procedural steps of the dispute settlement process (e.g., whether the parties are asked to submit written or oral statements; or whether the approved dispute settlement body requires a hearing etc.). The median time also reflects the fact that this was the first time that TikTok received Article 21 appeals, with little advance notice, and so had to build a process for such appeals while also responding to them.



Annex H - Monthly active recipients

This Annex H sets out the average number of 'monthly active recipients' in the European Union broken down per each Member State during the period 1 July to December 31 2024, rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.

We have produced this calculation for the purposes of complying with our obligations under the Article 42(3) of the DSA and it should not be relied on for other purposes. We have applied the same methodology used when calculating our total monthly active recipients number for the European Union published in February 2024. In light of our legal requirements to provide the number broken down per Member State and given that users may have accessed the platform from different Member States in the relevant period, the estimates below may mean, in certain limited circumstances, user access is counted more than once.

Where we have shared user metrics in other contexts, the methodology and scope may have differed. Our approach to producing this calculation may evolve or may require altering over time, for example, because of product changes or new technologies.

